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Zeilinger-Brukner’s informational foundationsof quantum theory, a theory based onZeilinger’s foundational principle for quantum
mechanics that an elementary system carried one bit
of information, explains seemingly unintuitive quan-
tum behavior with simple theoretical framework. It
is based on the notion that distinction between reality
and information cannot be made, therefore they are
the same. As the critics of informational foundations
of quantum theory show, this antirealistic move cap-
tures the theory in tautology, where information only
refers to itself, while the relationships outside the in-
formation with the help of which the nature of infor-
mation would be defined are lost and the questions
“Whose information? Information about what?” can-
not be answered. The critic’s solution is a return
to realism, where the observer’s effects on the infor-
mation are neglected. We show that radical antire-
alism of informational foundations of quantum the-
ory is not necessary and that the return to realism
is not the only way forward. A comprehensive ap-
proach that exceeds mere realism and antirealism is
also possible: we can consider both sources of the
constraints on the information, those coming from
the observer and those coming from the observed sys-
tem/nature/reality. The information is always the ob-
server’s information about the observed. Such a com-
prehensive philosophical approach can still support
the theoretical framework of informational founda-
tions of quantum theory: If we take that one bit is the
smallest amount of information in the form of which
the observed reality can be grasped by the observer,
we can say that an elementary system (grasped and
defined as such by the observer) correlates to one bit
of information. Our approach thus explains all the
features of the quantum behavior explained by infor-
mational foundations of quantum theory: the wave
function and its collapse, entanglement, complemen-
tarity and quantum randomness. However, it does so
in a more comprehensive and intuitive way. The pre-
sented approach is close to Husserl’s explanation of
the relationship between reality and the knowledge
we have about it, and to Bohr’s personal explanation
of quantum mechanics, the complexity of which has
often been missed and simplified to mere antirealism.
Our approach thus reconnects phenomenology with
contemporary philosophy of science and introduces
the comprehensive approach that exceeds mere real-
ism and antirealism to the field of quantum theories
with informational foundations, where such an ap-
proach has not been taken before.
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1 Introduction
A century after the establishment of fundamentals of quan-
tum mechanics, there is still no widely accepted interpre-
tation of the results of quantum experiments and of the
mathematical description of the quantum world. How-
ever, this does not mean that different interpretations of
quantum mechanics have not contributed to the under-
standing of the world around us. As Avshalom C. Elitzur
stated: “To be sure, physics would be very dull had these
interpretations not been proposed in the first place. They
teased researchers’ minds and stimulated experimentation
and theorizing” [1, p. 4].
In the last decades, quantum information theories have
been one of the most important mind teasers. They offered
different theoretical frameworks explaining the charac-
teristics of the quantum world and stimulated new exper-
iments. As they based the explanation of the quantum
world on the concept of information and considered the
relationship between information, knowledge and reality,
they opened some fundamental philosophical questions,
previously considered as too theory-laden to be included
in the formulation of fundamental theory: “Information?
Whose information? Information about what?” [2, p. 34].
This also holds for Brukner’s and Zeilinger’s informa-
tional foundations of quantum theory, a theory based on
Zeilinger’s foundational principle for quantum mechan-
ics that the most elementary system has the information
carrying capacity of at most one bit [3]. Brukner and
Zeilinger manage to explain some seemingly problematic
and unintuitive characteristics of the quantum world (e.g.
entanglement, collapse of the wave function) by using
simple theoretical framework based on a radical philo-
sophical proposition that distinction “between reality and
information, cannot be made” [4]. However, critics of
informational foundations of quantum theory emphasize
that this antirealistic move captures informational foun-
dations of quantum theory in tautology [5] where (the
system of) information is explained by (the characteris-
tics of) information [5, 6]. Furthermore, if information
is all we have, questions considering the nature of infor-
mation: “Information? Whose information? Information
about what?” [2], stay open and the philosophical basis of
informational foundations of quantum theory is undefined.
Consequently, the critics of the theory suggest return to
realism [5, 6].
In the present paper we will analyze the philosophi-
cal standpoint of informational foundations of quantum
theory, its problems and standpoints of its critics. We
will consider the need for Zeilinger’s and Brukner’s philo-
sophical radicalism, the justification of critic’s appeal to
realism and propose the third option, which exceeds mere
realism and antirealism.
2 Zeilinger-Brukner’s informational
foundations of quantum theory
Zeilinger-Brukner’s theoretical framework is based on
the concept of information. However, information is not
understood in a technical sense as in classical information
theory. Zeilinger and Brukner describe information as the
result of the observation, as the answer about the property
of the observed system. One bit of information represents
one possible answer to the question about the property of
the object of investigation. For example, to the question
“Spin up?” there are two possible answers, “yes” (spin
up) or “no” (spin down) [7]. Regarding information as
the answer to the question about the measured property,
Zeilinger equates the role of knowledge and information
in several papers, when he describes knowledge or infor-
mation about an object [3, 8] or of reality [4].
Exceeding the point of view of realism of ontic ap-
proaches, where the scientific knowledge about reality is
taken as a direct manifestation of reality, while the influ-
ence of the one observing/measuring and the observation
process/measurement are neglected, informational foun-
dations of quantum theory follows the epistemic approach
and closely considers the way we refer to reality, the form
in which we grasp reality; as Zeilinger writes: “there is no
way to refer to reality without using the information we
have about it” [4]. Based on this observation, Zeilinger
presupposes that: “it is important not to make distinc-
tions that have no basis” and concludes: “the distinction
between reality and our knowledge of reality, between
reality and information, cannot be made” [4], therefore:
“Wirklichkeit und Information sind dasselbe” (“Reality
and information are the same”) [7, p. 317].
This equation between reality and information is the
basis of the foundational principle of informational foun-
dations of quantum theory. If we decompose “a system
which may be represented by numerous propositions into
constituent systems”, each “constitutent system will be
represented by fewer propositions” and
the limit is reached when an individual system
finally represents the truth value to one single
proposition only. Such a system we can call an
elementary system. We thus suggest a principle
of quantization of information as follows. An
elementary system represents the truth value of
one proposition. [...] We now note that the truth
value of a proposition can be represented by
one bit of information [...] Thus our principle
becomes simply: An elementary system carries
one bit of information. [3, p. 635]
However, regarding the antirealistic character of their
theory, Zeilinger and Brukner emphasize:
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the notions such as that a system “represents”
the truth value of a proposition or that it “car-
ries” one bit of information only implies a state-
ment concerning what can be said about pos-
sible measurement results. For us a system
is no more than a representative of a proposi-
tion. [9, p. 326]
Considering this, Zeilinger and Kofler describe the foun-
dational principle as: “An elementary system is the mani-
festation of one bit of information” [8, p. 476].
On the basis of this simple foundational principle,
Zeilinger and Brukner can explain the seemingly un-
intuitive fundamental quantum phenomena revealed by
quantum experiments. The principle explains quantum
randomness and complementarity: since an elementary
system carries the answer to one question only, all other
answers must contain an element of randomness.
The extreme case is when the measurement di-
rection is orthogonal to the eigenstate direction.
Then for the new measurement situation the
system does not carry any information whatso-
ever, and the result is completely random. [...]
The information carried now by the system is
not in any way determined by the information it
carried before the measurement. Thus we con-
clude that the new information the system now
represents has been spontaneously created in
the measurement itself. We finally remark that
the viewpoint just presented lends natural sup-
port to Bohr’s notion of complementarity. This
notion is well known, for example, for position
and momentum or for the interference pattern
and the path taken in a two-slit experiment; pre-
cise knowledge of one quantity excludes any
knowledge of the other complementary quan-
tity. [3, p. 636]
Furthermore, Zeilinger argues that the entanglement as an-
other fundamental feature of quantum mechanics follows
from a slight generalization of the foundational principle.
In quantum mechanics, states are said to be entangled if
for any composite system of two or more particles there
exist pure states of the system (states that are as com-
pletely specified as the theory allows) in which parts of
the system do not have pure states of their own [10].
N elementary systems represent the truth values
of N propositions. N elementary systems carry
N bits. [...] After the interaction the N bits
might still be represented by the N systems
individually or, alternatively, they might all be
represented by the N systems in a joint way, in
the extreme with no individual system carrying
any information on its own. In the latter case
we have complete entanglement. [3, p. 637]
In the case of complete entanglement of two elementary
systems, two bits of information are used to describe joint
properties: e.g. should the spins of the two systems be
measured along the z axis, they would be found to be
identical and should they be measured along the x axis,
they would be also found to be identical. These two
propositions now uniquely determine the entangled quan-
tum state, which does not contain any information about
the individual systems. Therefore, any measurement per-
formed on individual systems gives completely random
results [3, 11].
The framework of informational foundations of quan-
tum theory can also be used to explain the seemingly
paradoxical collapse of the wave function:
There is never a paradox if we realize that the
wave function is just an encoded mathematical
representation of our knowledge of the system.
When the state of a quantum system has a non-
zero value at some position in space at some
particular time, it does not mean that the sys-
tem is physically present at that point, but only
that our knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of
the system allows the particle the possibility of
being present at that point at that instant. What
can be more natural than to change the represen-
tation of our knowledge if we gain new knowl-
edge from a measurement performed on the sys-
tem? When a measurement is performed, our
knowledge of the system changes, and there-
fore its representation, the quantum state, also
changes. In agreement with the new knowledge,
it instantaneously changes all its components,
even those which describe our knowledge in
the regions of space quite distant from the site
of the measurement. [9]
Based on equation between reality and information, the
mathematical formulation describing the quantum world
can be taken as a mere representation of our knowledge:
with the measurement we gain, new knowledge and conse-
quently the presentation of knowledge changes. The wave
function and the measured property are just two different
representations of different information. In informational
foundations of quantum theory information is not infor-
mation about reality, it is our only reality. Information
is understood as not causally connected to anything it
would be about. Consequently, the objectivity of infor-
mation cannot be taken as self-evident on the basis of the
common, from us independently existing outer world.
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Any concept of an existing reality is then a men-
tal construction based on these answers [(“yes”
or “no”) answers to the questions posed to Na-
ture]. Of course this does not imply that reality
is no more than a pure subjective human con-
struct. From our observations we are able to
build up objects with a set of properties that
do not change under variations of modes of ob-
servation or description. These are “invariants”
with respect to these variations. Predictions
based on any such specific invariants may then
be checked by anyone, and as a result we may
arrive at an intersubjective agreement about the
model, thus lending a sense of independent re-
ality to the mentally constructed objects. [9, p.
351]
Objectivity of the quantum world can be taken into ac-
count only on the basis of certain invariants and of the
inter-subjective agreement about the gained information
and its meaning. On this basis it is possible to exceed the
solipsism and to conclude that a system of information,
independent from us, forms, what we can call objective
reality, so that the outer world (in that sense) exists [7].
In informational foundations of quantum theory we
can speak about an inter-subjective world of information,
however, we cannot speak about the outer world that this
information is about and which would be a basis for sci-
entific objectivity. As critics of informational foundations
of quantum theory emphasize, if information and reality
are the same [7], we can end up in tautology, where all
the information describes is information [5], it only ex-
plains (a system of) information by (the characteristics
of) information [6].
Zeilinger’s argument is based on sensible notion about
the relationship between reality and information that we
always refer to reality with the information we have about
it [4]. However, by equating reality and information the
sensible observation changes in tautology. The statement
that the argument should support, destroys the sensibility
of the argument itself. Now information only refers to
itself.
By equating information and reality, the informational
foundations of quantum theory loses the relationships
outside the information with the help of which the mere
nature of information would be defined. If information is
all we have the answer to the question “Information about
what?” cannot be provided. Despite the epistemic charac-
ter of informational foundations of quantum theory, even
the answer to the question “Whose information?” is not
clear–if we can speak about a system of information inde-
pendent from us, whose information it is then? It seems
that the connection between information and the one get-
ting/possessing this information has been lost within the
attempts to assure the objectivity of information. As the
critics of informational foundations of quantum theory
put it:
The very concepts of knowledge and informa-
tion imply a special kind of relationship be-
tween different things, appropriate correlations
between a knower and what is known. Thus
“the distinction between reality and our knowl-
edge of reality” not only can be made; it must
be made if the notions of knowledge and in-
formation are to have any meaning in the first
place. [5, p. 131]
3 Critic’s standpoint
Critic’s response to the problems in the epistemic ap-
proach of informational foundations of quantum theory
and the radical antirealism of its authors is a return to
the realism of ontic approaches. In the work by Daumer
and colleagues [5] this can be seen in repeated praise of
“Bohm’s simple deterministic” explanation of quantum
mechanics and simultaneous criticism of “the convoluted
indeterministic one of the Copenhagen view.” Timpson’s
criticism [6], however, offers more direct insight into the
problems faced by informational foundations of quan-
tum theory. Timpson labels informational foundations
of quantum theory’s epistemic position as immaterialist
metaphysics, where results of measurement do not per-
tain to an externally existing mind-independent world and
the object is just a useful construct connecting observa-
tions. He consents to Zeilinger’s point of view that the
immaterialistic or antirealistic position in informational
foundations of quantum theory is based on Copenhagen
tradition and that it can be found in similar form in Bohr’s
description of his own point of view. Commenting on
supposedly similar Bohr’s and Zeilinger’s understanding
of the relationship between physics, Nature and reality,
Timpson’s own standpoint becomes clear:
The last sentence [of the statement famously
attributed to Bohr by Petersen] is particularly
pertinent: “Physics concerns what we can say
about nature.” Compare again, another state-
ment of Zeilinger’s, “...what can be said about
Nature has a constitutive contribution on what
can be real.” I think we find in these sentiments
a crucial strand contributing to the thought that
the rise of quantum information theory supports
an informational immaterialism. If quantum
mechanics reveals that the true subject matter
of physics is what can be said, rather than how
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things are, then this seems very close to saying
that what is fundamental is the play of infor-
mation across our psyche. [...] However, it is
important to recognize that there is a very ob-
vious difficulty with the thought that what can
be said provides a constitutive contribution to
what can be real and that physics correspond-
ingly concerns what we can say about nature.
Simply reflect that some explanation needs to
be given of where the relevant constraints on
what can be said come from. Surely there could
be no other source for these constraints than the
way the world actually is, it cannot merely be a
matter of language. [6, p. 225]
Timpson criticizes the merely epistemic approach of infor-
mational foundations of quantum theory, which lacks con-
sideration of the constraints coming from Nature. How-
ever, he replaces it with a merely ontic approach: for
Timpson “there could be no other source for [the relevant
constraints on what can be said] than the world actually
is” [6, p. 225]. The informational foundations of quan-
tum theory’s epistemic position–the consideration of the
way we refer to reality, of the constraints coming from
the observational/descriptional ability of the one observ-
ing/describing Nature–is now completely left out. For
Zeilinger, reality and information are the same, we could
say that reality is merely the manifestation of information,
for Timpson reality is all there is to affect what can be
said in physics, we could say that information is merely
the manifestation of reality.
Antirealism of the epistemic approach taken in infor-
mational foundations of quantum theory leads to some
serious philosophical problems: the argumentation on
which the equation between reality and information and
consequently the foundational principle for quantum me-
chanics are based is lost in tautology, while the mere
nature of information cannot be comprehensively defined.
But is the return to the realism of ontic approaches really
the only way forward?
4 Exceeding mere realism and
antirealism
On the one hand, informational foundations of quantum
theory is based on radical antirealism, on the other hand,
the critique of informational foundations of quantum the-
ory is based on radical realism. However, despite very
rarely used in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, a
comprehensive view that would consider both constraints:
those coming from the way nature actually is and those
coming from the way we (can) observe, describe Nature,
is also possible.
As Zeilinger pointed out, we always refer to reality
with the information, we have about it. Or to put it oth-
erwise, reality is always given to us in the form of infor-
mation. We cannot grasp the reality us such, we observe
the reality and get the information about it on the basis
of this observation. This is always the information about
the reality, or to be more precise, about the observed sys-
tem, thus defining the observed as the part of reality we
(the one observing) are focused on, as the object of the
observation process. However, as information is always
information about reality and not reality itself, the con-
straints defining the information cannot come just from
the way the observed system is. The information is al-
ways information for (or to put it otherwise, according
to) someone that receives this information, thus defining
this someone as the observer: in the present article the
observer is defined as the one receiving the information
about the observed; based on our experiences we have
an insight only into how human being’s receive and pro-
cess the information, so, when not stated otherwise we
will speak about a human being observer, though the
term observer is a broader term. Information as the ob-
server’s information is always co-defined by the way the
observer (can) observe(s), measure(s), describe(s) and
understand(s) the observed.
Following a comprehensive view that exceeds the rad-
icalism of mere realism or mere antirealism and consid-
ers the complex relationships between information and
other agents of the observation process, the fundamental
philosophical questions about the nature of information:
“Information? Whose information? Information about
what?” [2], can be easily answered:
Information about what? It is information about the
observed. In the case of the description of a particular
measurement, we can say that information is the value
of the position or of the polarization along a particular
direction of the (observed) photon. However, this infor-
mation only describes the observed in the context of that
particular measurement. This knowledge cannot be gener-
alized to the observed in all contexts, since the quantum
observed is changed by the measurement. Information is
causally connected with the observed; what we know is
causally connected with what there is. However, informa-
tion does not present the observed in itself, information is
the observed as perceived by the observer in the context
of the particular observation process.
Whose information? It is the observer’s information.
It is always information of the one who observes the ob-
served. Information is thus causally connected to the
observer’s way of observation, context of observation
and his ability to observe. We should not attribute the ob-
served any a priori properties independent of the observer
and context of description.
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The question is, is such a comprehensive approach pos-
sible in quantum theory with informational foundations,
or is the Zeilinger’s and Brukner’s radicalism, which
makes informational foundations of quantum theory vul-
nerable to philosophical critique, necessary for the theo-
retical framework based on the concept of information.
Considering information as the observer’s information
about the observed, we can still base the foundational
principle for quantum mechanics on relation (but not on
equation) between reality and information about it: given
that one bit is the smallest amount of information in the
form of which the observed reality can be grasped by the
observer, we can say that the elementary system (grasped
and defined as such by the observer, on the basis of his
observation of reality) correlates to one bit of information.
All the fundamental features explained by informa-
tional foundations of quantum theory can be then ex-
plained by quantum theory with informational founda-
tions based on philosophical basis exceeding mere realism
or antirealism. Such a comprehensive approach enables
the insight into complex connections between informa-
tion, the observer and the observed and thus a complex
philosophical insight into the quantum world as described
by quantum theory with informational foundations.
4.1 Connections between information, the
observer and the observed
Information and the observed are both in two ways con-
nected to the observer:
4.1.1 Ontic connection
Information and the observed are connected to the ob-
server as to the one who, by trying to get information,
already (necessary) has an influence on the observed, be-
cause the inclusion of the observed in the observation
process already influences how the observed is. This
connection is a precondition to get information about the
observed.
When a quantum system is measured, it entangles with
(the observer’s) environment. This is described as deco-
herence, “the practically irreversible dislocalization (in
Hilbert space) of superpositions due to ubiquitous en-
tanglement with the environment” [12, p. 7]. However,
to describe something, it is necessary to be outside the
described set. If the observer is to describe this entan-
glement, he has to put the cut between the entangled
system he is describing and himself. Usually the cut is
put between the measurement apparatus and the observer,
who thus describes the quantum system and the measure-
ment apparatus as the entangled system and thus as the
quantum observed.
The postulate that to describe something, it is neces-
sary to be outside the described set, operationalistically
explains the cut between quantum and classical in the
process of measurement and is thus identical to Heisen-
berg’s consideration of this problem known as “Heisen-
berg cut” [13]. This cut is a necessary condition for the
possibility of empirical knowledge and is as such op-
erationalistic, but not arbitrary; the choice depends on
the nature of the experiment/approach and co-defines the
way the observer describes the observed. However, since
quantum description is universal, while classical physics
can describe only complex classical systems, the cut can-
not be shifted arbitrary in the direction of the quantum
system, but it can “be shifted arbitrarily far in the direction
of the observer in the region that can otherwise be de-
scribed according to the laws of classical physics” [14, p.
12].
When considering the connection between the ob-
server, information and the observed from the ontic point
of view, the answer to the question “what is changed at
measurement?” would be–the observed. Of course, we
cannot approach the observed directly, the observed by
itself, we can only claim that what is changed is our in-
formation about the (changed) observed in the context of
a particular measurement (that caused the change).
4.1.2 Epistemic connection
Information and the observed are connected with the ob-
server as observer per se, as to the one for whom the
information has a meaning. On the basis of the ontic con-
nection the information becomes available, on the basis
of the epistemic connection the information is grasped
by the observer. Information has a meaning only as long
as it is information for someone. Most probably the pre-
conditions of our comprehension are those that determine
information as the form, in which everything we compre-
hend is given. This epistemic connection can be described
with the concept of projection postulate, describing the
“collapse” of the state vector.
The cut between the quantum observed and the clas-
sical observer is now emplaced between the quantum
system and the measuring apparatus; between both com-
ponent systems of the total entangled system as defined
within the description of the ontic connection.
When considering the connection between the ob-
server, the observed and information from the epistemic
point of view, the answer to the question “what is changed
at measurement?” would be–our knowledge/our informa-
tion. However, this knowledge is still causally connected
to the observed. As we can see, the ontic and the epis-
temic connections between the observer, the observed
and information are mutually dependent.
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4.1.3 Fundamental features of the quantum
world
Based on the insight into complex connections between
information, the observer and the observed, some of the
fundamental features of the quantum world, explained
by informational foundations of quantum theory, can be
explained in a more comprehensive and intuitive way.
The wave function is still understood as the observer’s
knowledge, however, as the observer’s knowledge about
the observed that describes the observed before or after
the measurement (or more correctly about the potential
future/past observed). Thus it can describe the observer’s
knowledge only according to the potential (future) infor-
mation about the observed, according to potential results
of potential measurements. Therefore, the wave function
can be understood by the observer only as a probability
function.
Describing the quantum world as described by quan-
tum theory with informational foundations, we can say
that from the point of view of the observer, physical sys-
tems carry information and this informational content
is behind quantum behavior. We always get particular
information about the observed in the context of a partic-
ular observation. From the point of view of the observer
(which is the only point of view we can have), the ob-
served has the potential to give information even when
not in the observation process. However, the observed
is only defined by the particular information when in a
relationship with another (observing) system and only
for that observing system. Considering this, the quantum
behavior, and entanglement and randomness as its main
features, can be explained in a more comprehensive and
clear way:
In entangled system, one of the component systems
(one of the entangled particles) is defined only as a part
of the total entangled system. It is completely specified
from the point of view of the system it is entangled with,
but unspecified for an “outer” observer:
one could prepare a pair of particles, A and
B, in a superposition of the state “particle A
is at position x1 and particle B is at position
x3” and the state “particle A is at position x2
and particle B is at position x4”, formally writ-
ten as (|x1〉A|x3〉B + |x2〉A|x4〉B)/
√
2. In such an
entangled state, the composite system is com-
pletely specified in the sense that the correla-
tions between the individuals are well defined.
Whenever particle A is found at position x1 (or
x2), particle B is certainly found at x3 (or x4
respectively). However, there is no information
at all about whether particle A is at x1 or x2 and
whether B is at x3 or x4. [8, p. 472]
When particles A and B are entangled, particle A is com-
pletely determined from the point of view of particle B
and vice versa, each of them is completely determined
from the point of view of the “inner” observer, where the
observer is not understood as a human being observer, but
simply as a system “possessing” the information about
the other (observed) system. What is fully defined, are
not the particular properties as such, in the sense of ob-
jective reality for all the observers, but the relationship
between both component systems. Therefore from the
point of view of one of the component systems, with
respect to himself as a reference system, the other compo-
nent system is fully determined. A classical measurement
apparatus can get only a random answer to the question
about the position of the component system A or B. For
an “outer” observer the relationship between component
systems is determined, but not the component systems
themselves (because a reference system of the “outer”
observer cannot depend on the observed component sys-
tem). In the same way, all our properties (and properties
of other classical systems) are completely determined
(from the point of view of an “inner” observer, e.g., an
observer from our environment that considers himself as
the observer, myself as the observed and places the cut
somewhere between us), since in our classical everyday
world we are completely entangled with our environment
(different measurements are constantly performed on us).
Considering this, it seems that randomness is the ba-
sic “characteristic” of the world, while determinism is a
consequence of decoherence. In the case of description
of a measurement of a quantum system, the ontic connec-
tion between the observer, the observed and information
about it, is a description from the point of view of the
“outer” observer: the cut between the observer and the ob-
served is placed between the measurement apparatus and
the rest of our environment to describe the entanglement
of the quantum system. The epistemic connection is a de-
scription from the point of view of the “inner” observer:
according to us (as the observer’s), the observed quantum
system is now fully defined by the measured property.
5 Discussion
In informational foundations of quantum theory, seem-
ingly unintuitive quantum phenomena can be explained
using a simple foundational principle based on equation
between reality and information. However, this radical
antirealism makes informational foundations of quantum
theory vulnerable to philosophical critique, which empha-
sizes that informational foundations of quantum theory
ends up in tautology, where all the information describes
is information, while the relationships outside the infor-
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mation are lost and the answers to the questions “Infor-
mation? Whose information? Information about what?”
cannot be provided. Critic’s solution to these philosoph-
ical problems of informational foundations of quantum
theory is a turn to mere realism, where informational
foundations of quantum theory’s lack of consideration of
the constraints coming from Nature is replaced with the
lack of consideration of the constraints coming from the
way the observer observes/describes Nature.
However, as we show in section 4, mere antirealism
or realism are not the only available explanations of the
relationship between reality and information, a compre-
hensive approach that considers all the constraints–those
coming from the way Nature actually is and those coming
from the way the observer observes/describes Nature–is
also possible. The information can be understood as the
observer’s information about the observed. There exist
ontic and epistemic connections between information, the
observed and the observer. When a quantum system is
measured (and thus becomes the observed), it entangles
with the measurement apparatus. Consequently, its ontic
status is essentially changed and only now the informa-
tion about the observed is available to the observer, thus
leading to the epistemic connection. Now the observer
can describe the observed by one of his concepts. How-
ever, all of the observer’s concepts are classical concepts,
based on his experiences from his classical environment
and applicable only to the observed, which is part of this
environment (decoherence). The ontic and the epistemic
connection are mutually dependent and both, the observed
and the observer define the information.
Zeilinger’s and Brukner’s radical antirealism is not a
necessary philosophical standpoint for the explanation
of quantum behavior with the concept of information.
In a context of the presented comprehensive philosophi-
cal approach, the foundational principle of informational
foundations of quantum theory can still be formed, all the
fundamental features explained by informational founda-
tions of quantum theory still explained, while some of the
fundamental features of the quantum world, like the wave
function, entanglement and quantum randomness, can
now be explained in a more comprehensive and intuitive
way.
Considering the intuitiveness of such a comprehensive
approach, the question arises whether, after a century
after the establishment of fundamentals of quantum me-
chanics, such an approach really is something new. In
continental philosophy a similar explanation of the re-
lationship between reality and the knowledge one can
have about reality has been offered by Husserl’s phe-
nomenology, based on his understanding of the concept
of phenomenon. Husserl’s phenomenon can be described
as the thing as has been given/shown to me by itself, but
essentially to me, in my horizon, with the meaning it has
to me [15]. As such, phenomenon is always essentially
related to both, the observer (me) and the observed (the
thing). Phenomenon is always intentional phenomenon,
is phenomenon of something. The core of what we ob-
serve is the observed itself, but always within the horizon
of the observation process and according to our own ori-
entation. It is either an orientation towards thing itself
or a specific interest, e.g. admiration, esthetical contem-
plation, practical interest, and this difference is essential
for the observation. If things smell good or bad, these
are not properties of things themselves. This is how they
are given to the observer, because of his specific phys-
ical (bodily) interest, but these are always things given
to the observer by themselves. Belief in the outer world,
in reality, is Glaubengewissheit; it is belief in itself, be-
cause the connection between phenomenon and thing is
based on certainty of reason, which is the foundation of
any rational action in the world [16]. Husserl applied
both the constraints, those coming from the thing (the ob-
served/reality) and those coming from the observer’s way
of observing, to the phenomenon and we could say that
he considered phenomenon as the observer’s information
about the observed reality.
Despite great relevance of Husserl’s work to quan-
tum mechanics, Husserl’s phenomenology and quantum
mechanics have only rarely been considered together
[18–22], mostly due to the general separation between
physics and philosophy during the so called “shut up and
calculate era” [26] in the middle of 20th century and to
the more personal “philosophical and political parting of
the ways [between phenomenologists and philosophers
of science] in pre-war Germany” [17]. However, accord-
ing to [18, 20], Bohr’s personal interpretation of quantum
mechanics, though not directly influenced by Husserl,
also considered both constraints: those that come from
Nature/reality and those that come from the way the ob-
server observes/measures Nature. In the Introduction
to the forth volume of his Philosophical writings, his
position is described as ontological realism and epistemo-
logical anti-realism:
Bohr’s insistence that the description of nature
involves the description of interactions between
measuring instruments and the objects whose
properties they are designed to measure [...]
commits him to an ontological realism. [...]
Not only did Bohr deny that atomic objects
were purely constructions, but also he [... dis-
tinguished] his view from those philosophers
who regarded the measurement interaction as
in some sense ‘creating’ the object of measure-
ment. [...] At the same time, however, Bohr [...]
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argues strongly against those forms of realism
which would attempt to describe an objectively
existing, independent reality in terms of con-
cepts which are well-defined only in relation
to ‘phenomena’, as he uses that term. Bohr’s
ontological realism extends beyond the macro-
realm to the atomic domain, nevertheless his
epistemological anti-realism prohibits any at-
tempt to carry the descriptive concepts of clas-
sical physics necessary for the description of
phenomena beyond the phenomenal sphere to a
world of things-in-themselves. [23, pp. 12–13]
Bohr’s position exceeds mere realism and antirealism:
the information we get in the process of the measurement
is information about the observed, about the measured
object, however, it is the observer’s information and not
a direct manifestation of the observed: the observer can
describe the measured observed by one of his classical
concepts, but this concept is not applicable to the ob-
served in all contexts and cannot be taken as the property
defining the observed independently from the context of
particular observation.
Though comprehensive and influential, Bohr’s interpre-
tation has been often misunderstood and simplified, espe-
cially after the so called “shut up and calculate” era, when
a direct flow of knowledge especially between physicists
and contemporary philosophers outside mere philoso-
phy of science was broken. Partly integrated into the
Copenhagen interpretation, where it was combined with
common views of different quantum physicists mostly
gathered around Bohr’s Institute of Theoretical Physics in
Copenhagen, Bohr’s interpretation lost its complexity and
sharpness. As we have shown in section 3, both, Zeilinger
from his antirealistic point of view and Timpson from his
realistic point of view, understand Bohr as immaterial-
ist and antirealist and interpret the statement famously
attributed to Bohr by Petersen accordingly:
It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to
find out how nature is. Physics concerns what
we can say about nature. [24, p. 8]
Simplifying Bohr’s point of view, Zeilinger and Timpson
both limit themselves on “Physics concerns what we can
say”. For Timpson this reveals the problematic immateri-
alism:
If quantum mechanics reveals that the true sub-
ject matter of physics is what can be said, rather
than how things are, then this seems very close
to saying that what is fundamental is the play
of information across our psyches. [6, p. 225]
In contrast, for Zeilinger it directly supports his under-
standing of quantum mechanics as only indirectly a sci-
ence of reality and predominately a science of knowledge
and thus of information [25]. However, such understand-
ings of Bohr’s view are only possible, because the second
part of his statement is disregarded: “Physics concerns
what we can say about nature” [24, p.8] (our emphasis).
Exceeding mere realism or antirealism, Bohr’s statement
considers both the constraints, those coming from the
observer–“what we can say”–and those coming from the
observed–“about nature”. Thus, Bohr’s statement is not
implying that “the true subject matter of physics is what
can be said” [6] and neither that quantum mechanics is
predominately a science of knowledge [25]. It implies
that the task of physics cannot be to describe nature as
such, nature as it is, but nature as given to the observer
in the form of phenomena (the expression used by Bohr,
see the comparison between Husserl’s and Bohr’s usage
of the term phenomenon in [18]).
As a dialog within the philosophical consideration of
quantum theories with informational foundations is lim-
ited on opposition between realism and antirealism, the
comprehensiveness of Bohr’s position is lost. The ap-
proach taken in the present paper is not completely new in
philosophy or even in philosophy of quantum mechanics,
but it is completely new within quantum information the-
ory: it connects a comprehensive philosophical approach
exceeding mere realism and antirealism with understand-
ing of the relationship between reality and information,
solves philosophical problems of antirealistic quantum
theories with informational foundations, helps to better
define the nature of information and shows the limitness
of the realistic critique of antirealistic approach within
informational foundations of quantum theory. Further-
more, it reconnects philosophical thought outside mere
philosophy of science with contemporary quantum me-
chanics and shows that such a connection can definitely
benefit our understanding of the world around us. Half
a century after the so called “shut up and calculate” era
their dialogue should finally be renewed. We believe that
our study can serve as a model of a successful connec-
tion between philosophical aspects and new knowledge
emerging in the field of quantum mechanics.
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